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Prospect Theory-Based Active Consumer Behavior Under Variable Electricity Pricing

机译:电力定价下基于前景理论的主动消费者行为

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Active consumers who engage in energy consumption, production and provide ancillary services in a dynamic and interactive manner will be an integral part of the future grid. This paper models and analyzes interaction between active consumers and aggregators with a specific focus on consumer actions in response to real-time electricity pricing and their impacts on grid voltage. First, this paper introduces a unique prospect theory-based consumer behavior model that captures wide range of consumers each with their individual preferences. Second, the interaction between consumers and aggregators is modeled as a Stackelberg game. However, unlike existing game theoretic efforts that assume rational behavior of consumers, the prospect theory-based models systematically incorporate realistic consumer behavior including irrationality. Another unique aspect of the formulation is the inclusion of the physical grid constraints (in terms of voltage violations) within the analysis. In contrast to prior approaches that limit themselves to economic aspects, the proposed techno-economic perspective provides an understanding of the impact of large scale penetration of active consumers on the physical grid. The proposed model is analyzed using simulations on the IEEE 69 bus test system and the impact of irrationality on both consumer/aggregator payoffs and voltage violations is quantified.
机译:积极参与能源消耗,生产并以动态和交互方式提供辅助服务的消费者将成为未来电网不可或缺的一部分。本文建模并分析了活跃的消费者与聚集者之间的互动,并特别关注了响应实时电价及其对电网电压的影响的消费者行为。首先,本文介绍了一个独特的基于前景理论的消费者行为模型,该模型可以捕获各种具有各自偏好的消费者。其次,将消费者与聚合器之间的交互建模为Stackelberg游戏。但是,与现有的假设消费者行为合理的博弈理论不同,基于前景理论的模型系统地结合了包括非理性在内的现实消费者行为。公式的另一个独特方面是在分析中包括了物理电网约束(就违反电压而言)。与将自己局限于经济方面的现有方法相比,拟议的技术经济观点提供了对活跃消费者大规模渗透到物理网格上的影响的理解。使用IEEE 69总线测试系统上的仿真对提出的模型进行了分析,并量化了非理性对消费者/聚集器收益和电压违规的影响。

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