Rationalist Theories of International Politics and the Problem of the Future

摘要

Charles Glaser's Rationalist Theory of International Politics nicely extends his work on contingent realism begun in the mid-1990s.1 The rationalist theory he puts forward focuses on three main causal variables: material factors such as the offense-defense balance and power; informational variables, primarily leader uncertainty about the motives of key adversaries; and a state's motives per se, namely, whether it is a security-seeking actor or has "greedy" non-security reasons for acting. Glaser's core contribution comes with his balanced reworking of one of the foundational concepts of international relations: the security dilemma. In a chapter entitled simply "The Theory," Glaser effectively shows that depending on its intensity, the security dilemma can cut both ways, either encouraging states to compete or convincing them that moderate behavior is best. When offense has the advantage and states have information suggesting that adversaries have greedy motives, the security dilemma is intense, and states will be pushed into competitive spirals of arms racing, territorial expansion, and war. But when defense has the advantage and adversaries appear to be security seeking, the security dilemma is moderated, and states will avoid hard-line actions that might cause others to doubt their motives and intentions (see esp. 57-90).