Is the European Federation a ‘Mission Impossible’?: A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court's Judgment on the Lisbon Treaty

摘要

In its judgment on the Treaty of Lisbon, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany stated that in establishing a European Federation the European Parliament by reason of its composition would not be a sufficient subject of democratic legitimization and that, in the event of the foundation of a European Federation, Germany would have to enact a new constitution by referendum. The article investigates these statements by analyzing the Court's understanding of an “association of sovereign national states” (“Staatenverbund”), the EU as a supranational body, the notions of ‘constitutional identity’ and ‘sovereignty’, the requirements for democratic representation in the EU, the new categorization of EU competences and the needs for their delimitation. In the final part of the article the judicial prospects for a European Federation are examined and such prospects are found not to be a ‘mission impossible’.View full textDownload full textKeywordsEuropean Union, European Federation, democratic representation, sovereignty, comparative federalismRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2010.541672