...
首页> 外文期刊>Quality Control, Transactions >Ingress of Threshold Voltage-Triggered Hardware Trojan in the Modern FPGA Fabric–Detection Methodology and Mitigation
【24h】

Ingress of Threshold Voltage-Triggered Hardware Trojan in the Modern FPGA Fabric–Detection Methodology and Mitigation

机译:现代FPGA织物检测方法的阈值电压触发硬件特洛伊木马的入口和缓解

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

The ageing phenomenon of negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) continues to challenge the dynamic thermal management of modern FPGAs. Increased transistor density leads to thermal accumulation and propagates higher and non-uniform temperature variations across the FPGA. This aggravates the impact of NBTI on key PMOS transistor parameters such as threshold voltage and drain current. Where it ages the transistors, with a successive reduction in FPGA lifetime and reliability, it also challenges its security. The ingress of threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan, a stealthy and malicious electronic circuit, in the modern FPGA, is one such potential threat that could exploit NBTI and severely affect its performance. The development of an effective and efficient countermeasure against it is, therefore, highly critical. Accordingly, we present a comprehensive FPGA security scheme, comprising novel elements of hardware Trojan infection, detection, and mitigation, to protect FPGA applications against the hardware Trojan. Built around the threat model of a naval warship's integrated self-protection system (ISPS), we propose a threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan that operates in a threshold voltage region of 0.45V to 0.998V, consuming ultra-low power (10.5nW), and remaining stealthy with an area overhead as low as 1.5% for a 28 nm technology node. The hardware Trojan detection sub-scheme provides a unique lightweight threshold voltage-aware sensor with a detection sensitivity of 0.251mVA. With fixed and dynamic ring oscillator-based sensor segments, the precise measurement of frequency and delay variations in response to shifts in the threshold voltage of a PMOS transistor is also proposed. Finally, the FPGA security scheme is reinforced with an online transistor dynamic scaling (OTDS) to mitigate the impact of hardware Trojan through run-time tolerant circuitry capable of identifying critical gates with worst-case drain current degradation.
机译:负偏置温度不稳定(NBTI)的老化现象继续挑战现代FPGA的动态热管理。增加的晶体管密度导致热累积,并在FPGA上传播更高且不均匀的温度变化。这加剧了NBTI对诸如阈值电压和漏极电流的关键PMOS晶体管参数的影响。在晶体管时,在FPGA寿命和可靠性的连续降低,它也挑战了其安全性。在现代FPGA中,阈值电压触发的硬件Trojan,一款隐秘和恶意电子电路的入口是一种可以利用NBTI和严重影响其性能的潜在威胁。因此,开发有效和有效的对策,因此非常关键。因此,我们提出了一种全面的FPGA安全方案,包括硬件特洛伊木马感染,检测和缓解的新型元素,以保护FPGA应用对抗硬件特洛伊木马。围绕海军军舰集成的自我保护系统(ISP)的威胁模型构建,我们提出了一个阈值电压触发的硬件特洛伊木马,其在0.45V至0.998V的阈值电压区域,消耗超低功耗(10.5nW) ,并留下耳朵,面积开销,对于28 nm技术节点,低至1.5%。硬件特洛伊木马检测子方案提供独特的轻质阈值电压感知传感器,检测灵敏度为0.251mV / na。还提出了利用固定和动态环振荡器的传感器段,还提出了响应于PMOS晶体管的阈值电压的响应响应响应频率和延迟变化的精确测量。最后,通过在线晶体管动态缩放(OTDS)加强了FPGA安全方案,以通过运行时间容差电路来减轻硬件特洛伊木马的影响,该电路能够识别具有最坏情况漏极电流劣化的关键栅极。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号