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Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan. This research paper contends that insider threats may be the most serious challenge that nuclear security systems face today. Using examples of past security failures to support that contention, it presents 10 cautionary lessons: Don't assume that serious insider problems are NIMO (not in my organization); don't assume that background checks will solve the insider problem; don't assume that red flags will be read properly; don't assume that insider conspiracies are impossible; don't rely on single protection measures; don't assume that organizational culture and employee dis-gruntlement don't matter; don't forget that insiders may know about security measures and how to work around them; don't assume that security rules are followed; don't assume that only consciously malicious insider actions matter; and don't focus only on prevention and miss opportunities for mitigation. (32 pp., PB [$6, plus $5 shipping and handling, ISBN 0-87724-097-3], or PDF [free download].
机译:Matthew Bunn和Scott D. Sagan。该研究论文认为,内部威胁可能是当今核安全系统面临的最严重挑战。通过使用过去的安全失败示例来支持该争论,它提供了10个警告性教训:不要以为严重的内部人员问题是NIMO(在我的组织中不是);不要以为背景调查会解决内部人员问题;不要以为红色标志会被正确读取;不要以为内幕阴谋是不可能的;不要依靠单一的保护措施;不要以为组织文化和员工不满无关紧要;不要忘记内部人员可能知道安全措施以及如何采取措施。不要假设遵循了安全规则;不要以为只有有意识的恶意内部人员行为才重要;并且不要只专注于预防和错过缓解机会。 (32页,PB [$ 6,另加$ 5运费和手续费,ISBN 0-87724-097-3]或PDF [免费下​​载]。

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    《Nuclear news》 |2014年第7期|23-23|共1页
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