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The Limits of Financial Risk Management: Or What we Didn't Learn from the Asian Crisis

机译:金融风险管理的局限性:或者我们没有从亚洲危机中学到什么

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摘要

In retrospect, the Asian financial crisis was the canary in the coal mine that global leaders failed to recognise. While both the Asian crisis and the current one were the product of excessive leverage, moral hazard and poor risk management, the lessons drawn from each appear to be rather different: the Asian crisis was largely seen as the fault of Asian governments, while the current crisis has been primarily blamed on market actors. Does this mean that we have learned collectively from the mistaken assessments of the previous crisis? Yes and no. After tracing the links between the response to the Asian crisis and the drive towards securitisation, this article suggests that while the international financial community has avoided repeating the first major error that they made after the Asian crisis - by recognising that the problems now lie as much at home as abroad - they continue to make a second and more profound error in their response to the subprime crisis: financial leaders continue to believe that a large part of the solution is to be found in greater transparency, more accurate risk assessment models, better due diligence - in short, to provide the markets with a truly comprehensive picture of the financial instruments that are being traded. I suggest that there are two crucial problems with this assumption. The first is that it is highly unlikely that it will ever be possible to truly calculate and quantify the indeterminacies that are at the heart of the process of securitisation and the originate to distribute (OTD) model. The second is that even if it were possible to develop such a comprehensive picture of the indeterminacies involved in securities markets, it is not at all clear that financial markets will have the capacity or the interest in making effective use of that information. These limits to financial risk management not only raise some serious questions about the kinds of regulatory solutions that are currently being proposed, but also make it all the more important that we develop a politically accountable response.View full textDownload full textKeywordsrisk, finance, crisis, subprimeRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563460903553582
机译:回想起来,亚洲金融危机是全球领导人未能意识到的煤矿中的金丝雀。尽管亚洲危机和当前的危机都是过度杠杆,道德风险和不良风险管理的产物,但从两者中汲取的教训似乎截然不同:亚洲危机在很大程度上被视为亚洲各国政府的过失,而当前危机主要归咎于市场参与者。这是否意味着我们从对上一次危机的错误评估中集体汲取了教训?是的,没有。在追踪了应对亚洲危机的反应与实现证券化的动力之间的联系之后,本文提出,尽管国际金融界避免了重蹈亚洲危机后所犯的第一个重大错误的覆辙,但同时也认识到问题的根源在于无论是在国内还是在国外-他们在应对次贷危机时仍会犯下第二个更深刻的错误:财务主管们仍然认为,解决方案的很大一部分要以更高的透明度,更准确的风险评估模型,更好的方式找到尽职调查-简而言之,是为了向市场提供正在交易的金融工具的真实全面的情况。我建议这种假设存在两个关键问题。首先,极有可能无法真正计算和量化作为证券化和原始分配(OTD)模型核心的不确定性。第二个问题是,即使有可能对证券市场的不确定性有一个全面的了解,但也不清楚金融市场是否有能力或有兴趣有效利用这些信息。这些对金融风险管理的限制不仅引起对当前提出的各种监管解决方案的严重质疑,而且使我们制定具有政治责任感的应对措施变得更加重要。查看全文下载全文关键字风险,金融,危机, subprimeRelated var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand:“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”,servicescompact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布号:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563460903553582

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