Consumers' preference modeling to price bundle offers in the telecommunications industry: a game with competition among operators

摘要

Network operators are merging their services, such as fixed or wireless telephony, internet or television, into single offers, called bundles. It is essential to understand consumers' preferences to define the most profitable bundles, with their associated prices, especially in the fierce competitive current market. We start by defining a random linear utility model and then, analyze the competition between an integrated operator and new entrants proposing substitutable services. Each operator ignores the consumers' reservation prices for his offers and has to deal with uncertainties about the marketing strategies of competitors, due to potential different size and cost structure. A two-level game is introduced and solved by backward induction. In the second level, the operators determine their optimal offer prices for each possible combination of marketing strategies while the consumers select their most profitable purchasing processes; the natural framework is that of Bayesian game theory. Finally at the top level, knowing the outcome of the other level, the operators identify which marketing strategy to use between market share expansion, segment targeting or multi-level price discrimination, to maximize their expected utilities conditionally to their private informations.