Does Classicism Explain Universality? Argumnets Against a Pure Classical Component of Mind

摘要

One of the hallmarks of human cognition is the capacity to generalize over arbitrary constituents. Recently, Marcus (1998, 1998a, b; Cognition 66, p. 153; Cognitive Psychology 37, p. 243) argued that this capacity, called "universal generalization" (universality), is not supported by Connectionist models. Instead, universality is best explained by Classical symbol systems, with Con- Nectionism as its implementation. Here it is argued that universality is also a problem for Classicism In that the syntax-sensitive rules that are supposed to provide causal explanations of mental processes Are either too strict, precluding possible generalization; or too lax, providing no information as to The appropriate alternative. Consequently, universality is not explained by a Classical theory.