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Lessons from the financial crisis: failure of markets or failure of regulation?

机译:金融危机的教训:市场失灵还是监管失灵?

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The popular, demagogic narrative after the global financial system's collapse in 2008 has held that the financial crisis signalled the failure of capitalism. However, regulators across the world must realize that the financial crisis was not brought about by the failure of markets but by the failure of governments to appropriately regulate markets. Beginning in the 1980s, and continuing over the quarter-century that followed, regulators afforded the world of big finance an unaffordable luxury: insurance against possible failure. As a result, banks and financial institutions became adept at turning their insulation from disorderly failure, as enforced by free markets, into insulation from market discipline, as inflicted by myopic regulators. This ‘too big to fail’ syndrome combined with the incorrect belief perpetrated by the Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan that financial companies, powered by a rational motive not to lose money, could police themselves and one another. In turn, such sanguine beliefs led to considerable over-supply of financial innovation. The supply created its own demand as the financial world operated under the implicit guarantee (and market distortion) created by the ‘too big to fail’ syndrome.The errors laid bare by the financial crisis clearly call for regulatory reform. But in designing that reform, regulators across the world should avoid the temptation to seek heavy-handed new approaches. Instead, policymakers should look to the long-term success of the system of rules whose decay brought about the crisis. Prudent regulations must seek to reinforce the fundamental principle that no one, however big or small, can be made immune to failure. Such pro-market regulation of finance is essential to preserving and fostering countries’ economic futures.View full textDownload full textKeywordsfinancial crisis, finance, regulation, marketsRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17520843.2011.591497
机译:在2008年全球金融体系崩溃之后,流行的,令人迷惑的叙述认为,金融危机预示着资本主义的失败。但是,全世界的监管机构必须意识到,金融危机不是由市场失灵引起的,而是由政府未能适当监管市场引起的。从1980年代开始,一直持续到随后的25个世纪,监管机构为大型金融世界提供了一种难以承受的奢侈:防止可能失败的保险。结果,银行和金融机构变得擅长将其从自由市场强制的无序失灵中解脱出来,转变为由近视监管者造成的市场纪律化解脱。这种“太大而不能倒”的综合症,再加上美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)的错误信念,即金融公司在理性动机的推动下不会赔钱,可以自行监管。反过来,这种乐观的信念导致了金融创新的大量供过于求。由于金融世界在“太大而不能倒”综合症所产生的隐含担保(和市场扭曲)下运作,因此供给产生了自己的需求。金融危机所掩盖的错误显然需要进行监管改革。但是在设计这项改革时,全世界的监管机构都应该避免寻求大手笔的新方法的诱惑。相反,政策制定者应着眼于规则体系的长期成功,这种规则体系的衰败导致了危机。审慎的法规必须寻求加强基本原则,即无论大小,任何人都不能免于失败。这种对市场的金融监管对于维护和促进国家的经济期货至关重要。 ,twitter,technorati,可口,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布号:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17520843.2011.591497

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