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China's Anti-Access Strategy and Regional Contingencies: Implications for East Asian and Korean Security

机译:中国的反访问战略和区域突发事件:对东亚和朝鲜安全的影响

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While China's new military capabilities are an issue of growing importance to regional security, it should be understood that they are very much a work in progress. It is also important to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its ability to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders-in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies in the region. This article argues that China's "anti-access capability"-a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan crisis-is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuous efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capabilities as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: 1. It is very important not to "overestimate" or "underestimate" China's actual military capability, as war is most likely when China overestimates and others underestimate the PLA's capability. 2. China's military not only employs mixed defense strategies but it also possesses both new and old (in fact, very old) military technologies. Its more than a dozen sources of foreign technologies are a nightmare for system integration and interoperability. 3. There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. 4. Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2012, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what it defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interest." 5. For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) a hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.
机译:尽管中国的新军事能力对区域安全越来越重要,但应该理解,它们在很大程度上仍在进行中。还必须指出的是,这本身并不是中国的军事现代化,而是其在边界之内和之外投射和维持权力的能力,尤其是有可能有效解决其悬而未决的海上争端和该地区各种突发事件的能力。本文认为,中国的“反访问能力”(这是美国最初为台湾危机开发的术语)也同样适用于其他主要地区案件,例如南沙群岛争端和朝鲜应急情况。此外,尽管中国不断努力开发和部署各种类型和种类的武器/平台,但俄罗斯的系统和技术才是最有能力的,因此被分配到任务关键性最高的地区。在评估中国目前和未来可能的军事实力及其对地区的影响时,有必要注意以下几点:1.重要的是不要像战争一样“高估”或“低估”中国的实际军事实力。最有可能是中国高估而其他国家低估了解放军的能力。 2.中国军队不仅采用混合防御策略,而且还拥有新旧军事技术(实际上是非常古老的)。它的十几种国外技术来源是系统集成和互操作性的噩梦。 3.中国与较弱的邻国之间的军事能力不对称。尽管PLAN在几个重要方面都很薄弱,但其许多邻国的海军仍然较弱。 4.有些人争辩说,中国的外交政策行为在2009-2012年显然变得更加“自信”,但是要记住,在定义为“主权和领土问题”时,中国始终是自信和进取的以及最新的“核心兴趣”。 5.为了韩国的安全,必须考虑到地缘战略和历史因素。除了北朝鲜现有的军事威胁外,韩国还应该能够采取以下措施:a)对冲策略,b)“有限的国防自给”策略,以及c)与美国的牢固关系。

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