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'Conflict-performance assumption' or 'performance-conflict assumption': Insights from franchising

机译:“冲突 - 绩效假设”或“绩效冲突假设”:特许经营的见解

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Franchising is an organizational governance form where relational and formal contracts complement each other and where franchisor and franchisees together may obtain better performance than working alone. Although relational contracts may adapt to changing environments, they are not as efficient in ambiguous settings. In franchised stores, liability for low performance is not always clear. Indeed, franchisor and franchisees work in close collaboration, and, therefore, this ambiguity on causes of low performance may lead to conflicts. The franchising literature, as far as we know, has addressed practitioners' concerns regarding performance on one side, and conflicts on the other side, but no study has exclusively focused on low performance and the emergence of conflicts. Our research contributes to the franchising literature by filling this relative gap and, contrary to "conflict-performance assumption" (Pearson, 1973; Duarte and Davies, 2003) held in the broader context of distribution channels, we consider low performance to be a cause, rather than a consequence, of franchisor/franchisee conflicts. This empirical study deals with franchising in France, the leading market in franchising in Europe and the third largest in the world. We used a qualitative approach based on 44 in-depth interviews with 27 franchisors and executives/high-level managers of franchise chains, as well as 17 franchisees from various industries to get a dual, and so more complete, assessment of franchising practitioners' views of performance-related conflicts. Our research findings show that franchisees, as independent small business owners, give priority to financial results compared to other goals and they are driven to continuously improve the performance of their store(s). When expectations are not met, franchisees sometimes blame franchisors because they are interdependent in their success and liability is not straightforward. As a collaborative team, franchisors and franchisees may benefit from minimizing conflicts and preventing them with the careful selection and management of franchisees that share franchisor's values and have internal locus of control.
机译:特许经营是一种组织治理形式,关系和正式合同彼此相辅相成,特许经营者和特许经营组合在一起可能获得比单独工作更好的表现。虽然关系合同可能适应不断变化的环境,但它们在模糊的环境中并不高效。在特许经营商店,低表现的责任并不总是清晰。实际上,特许经营者和特许经营者在密切合作中工作,因此,这种对低性能的原因的歧义可能导致冲突。据我们所知,特许经营的文学已经解决了从业者对一方面的表现的担忧,并在另一边的冲突,但没有研究专注于低绩效和冲突的出现。我们的研究通过填补这一相对差距,与“冲突 - 绩效假设”(Pearson,1973; Duarte和Davies,2003)相反,在分销渠道的更广泛的情况下,我们认为低表现是一个原因,而不是后果,特别是特许人/特许经营者冲突。本实证研究涉及法国的特许经营,欧洲特许经营的领先市场和世界第三大市场。我们使用了基于44个深入访谈的定性方法,与27名特许经营者和专营链条的高级专家/高级管理人员,以及来自各个行业的17名特许经营者,以获得双重等,更完整,评估特许经营从业者的观点与绩效相关的冲突。我们的研究结果表明,与独立小型企业主人一样,特许经营者与其他目标相比,优先考虑财务业绩,并被驱使不断提高其商店的表现。当不符合期望时,特许经营者有时会责备特许经营者,因为它们在他们的成功和责任方面是相互依存的,并且责任并不简单。作为一个协作团队,特许经营者和特许经营者可能会受益于最大限度地减少冲突,并在仔细选择和管理中,仔细选择和管理共享特许经营者的价值观并具有内部控制轨迹。

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