首页> 外文期刊>Journal of public economic theory >Job creators, job creation, and the tax code
【24h】

Job creators, job creation, and the tax code

机译:职位创造者,职位创造和税法

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
获取外文期刊封面目录资料

摘要

This paper considers the role of the tax code in determining income dispersion and vacancy creation. A "span-of-control" model is embedded into a search and matching environment. A cut to the tax on profits in isolation improves job creation and reduces before-tax income inequality. The impact of a budget-balancing increase in the wage tax depends on the bargaining power of firms. When it is high, firms pick up the lion's share of the tax burden. The tax acts like a barrier to entry: it benefits large firms at the expense of marginal ones. Net effects are an increase in unemployment and before-tax income dispersion. Low firm bargaining power means workers pick up more of the tax burden. It acts like a subsidy to entrepreneurship reinforcing the impact of the profit tax reduction. Taxes on the returns to capital leave everyone worse off.
机译:本文考虑了税法在确定收入分散和空缺创造中的作用。 “控制范围”模型被嵌入到搜索和匹配环境中。孤立地削减利润税可以改善创造就业机会,并减少税前收入不平等。预算税增加工资税的影响取决于企业的议价能力。当价格很高时,企业将承担税负的最大部分。税收就像进入壁垒一样:它使大型企业受益,却使边际企业受益。净影响是失业人数增加和税前收入分散。企业讨价还价能力低意味着工人承担了更多的税负。它像对企业家的补贴一样,增强了减少利得税的影响。资本收益税使每个人的处境变得更糟。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号