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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of organizational behavior >Does agency theory have universal relevance? A reply to Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, and Very
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Does agency theory have universal relevance? A reply to Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, and Very

机译:代理理论是否具有普遍意义?回复Lubatkin,Lane,Collin和Very

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We are fully sympathetic to the view held by Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, and Very (this issue) that social context is an important and often over-looked influence on principal-agent (P/A) relations. Clearly, P/A relations are embedded within a social context. This context plays an important role in (a) defining self-interest for both agents and principals, (b) determining the degree of potential incongruence between the objectives of agents and those of principals, and (c) designing efficient mechanisms for aligning agent interests with those of principals. Agency theory has been used and interpreted in many ways depending on the author's disciplinary tradition and the problem at hand (see for instance, Eisenhardt, 1989; and Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne, & Wiseman, 2000 for reviews). One of the most popular targets for critics of agency theory (including some of our own work, e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1998; Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Fugate, 2000) is the P/A model by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Their model has driven a considerable amount of research on P/A relations (according to the Web of Science (2006), it has been cited 3414 times as of this writing) and is thus often used as representative of agency theory. In developing their version of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling incorporated assumptions borrowed from managerial economics. For example, relying on subjective expected utility notions of individual behavior, Jensen and Meckling assumed agents were inherently risk averse. While this may reflect settings where agents have undiversifiable risks, this clearly represents a special case of agency theory, which is mostly applicable to a market economy with dispersed shareholdings and a competitive labor market. As our past work has suggested, agents may or may not be risk averse and thus risk aversion represents a special case of goal conflict (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Though we certainly do not want to become apologists for a model that we ourselves have criticized, it does seem to us a bit harsh to criticize an entire theory based on one application of the theory.
机译:我们完全同情Lubatkin,Lane,Collin和Very(本期)所持的观点,即社会背景对委托人(P / A)关系具有重要的作用,而这一点常常被忽视。显然,P / A关系嵌入在社交环境中。在(a)定义代理人和委托人的自身利益,(b)确定代理人的目标与委托人的目标之间的潜在不一致程度,以及(c)设计有效的机制以协调代理人的利益之间,这种情况起着重要的作用。与校长的。代理理论已根据作者的学科传统和所面临的问题以多种方式使用和解释(例如,参见Eisenhardt,1989; Gomez-Mejia,Welbourne和Wiseman,2000)。批评代理理论(包括我们自己的一些作品,例如Gomez-Mejia和Wiseman,1998; Wiseman,Gomez-Mejia和Fugate,2000)最受批评的目标之一是Jensen和Meckling的P / A模型。 (1976)。他们的模型推动了对P / A关系的大量研究(根据Web of Science(2006年),在撰写本文时已被引用3414次),因此经常被用作代理理论的代表。在发展他们的代理理论的过程中,詹森和梅克林结合了从管理经济学中借来的假设。例如,根据个人行为的主观预期效用概念,Jensen和Meckling假定代理人固有地规避风险。尽管这可能反映了代理人具有无法分散的风险的环境,但这显然代表了代理理论的特例,它主要适用于股权分散的市场经济和竞争激烈的劳动力市场。正如我们过去的工作所表明的那样,代理人可能会也可能不会规避风险,因此规避风险是目标冲突的一种特殊情况(Wiseman&Gomez-Mejia,1998)。尽管我们当然不想成为我们自己已经批评过的模型的辩护律师,但在我们看来,基于一种理论的应用来批评整个理论似乎有点苛刻。

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