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Openness, Central Bank Independence, and the Sacrifice Ratio

机译:开放性,中央银行独立性和牺牲率

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摘要

Traditional explanations of the negative correlation between openness and inflation presume that an inverse relationship between the degree of openness and the sacrifice ratio reduces the inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy. Temple (2002) concludes, however, that such a relationship fails to emerge in cross-country data. Our analysis of the same crosscountry data considered by Temple indicates that once the degree of central bank independence and its interaction with greater openness is considered, there is an unambiguous positive relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio. In addition, increased openness lessens the positive effect of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio.
机译:关于开放度和通货膨胀之间的负相关性的传统解释认为,开放度和牺牲率之间的反比关系会降低任意货币政策的通货膨胀偏差。 Temple(2002)得出结论,但是这种关系在跨国数据中没有出现。我们对Temple所考虑的同一跨国数据的分析表明,一旦考虑到中央银行的独立程度及其与更大开放度的相互作用,开放度和牺牲率之间就存在明确的正相关关系。此外,开放程度的提高会减少中央银行独立性对牺牲率的积极影响。

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