Correction to: End of the sovereign-bank doom loop in the European Union? The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive

摘要

In this paper we examine the relationship between the default risk of banks and sovereigns, i.e. the 'doom-loop'. Specifically, we try to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the new recovery and resolution framework in the European Union. We use a panel with daily data on European banks and sovereigns ranging from 2012 to 2016 in order to test the effects of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive on the two-way feedback process. We find that there was a pronounced feedback loop between banks and sovereigns from 2012 to 2014. However, after the implementation of the European Banking Union, in 2015/2016, the magnitude of the doom-loop decreased and the spillovers became not statistically significant. Furthermore, our results suggest that the implementation of the new resolution framework is a suitable candidate to explain this finding. Overall, the results are robust across several specifications.