The Legal, Military and Political Consequences of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ Approach to UN Military Enforcement Action

摘要

The UN Charter envisaged a centralised system of collective security in which the UN Security Council would have readily available forces of its own for the purpose of taking military enforcement action under its own authority and control. These forces were never created and the Security Council has had to rely heavily upon authorising willing coalitions of states to take action on its behalf. Although such an approach to military enforcement action is legally permissible, it gives rise to a series of consequences of a legal, military and political nature that call into question the extent to which it provides the Council with an effective means of exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This article considers these consequences of the ‘coalition of the willing’ approach to military enforcement action, and seeks to show that its utility will vary from one situation to another. Although difficulties can arise from operations being subjected to insufficient levels of ultimate legal oversight by the Security Council, or through military operational problems, the limitations of the ‘coalition of the willing’ as an effective tool of the Council are likely to lie primarily in the political sphere.