首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Cleaner Production >A comparative study on recycling amount and rate of used products under different regulatory scenarios
【24h】

A comparative study on recycling amount and rate of used products under different regulatory scenarios

机译:不同监管场景下使用产品的回收量和率的比较研究

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

Used products recycling is a cleaner and greener mode of production. The multiple uncertainties in the process of recycling and reproduction require appropriate government regulation. On the basis of classical game theory, the positive influence of cooperative social reputation is also considered, and a dynamic Stackelberg game model dominated by manufacturers is constructed. The comparison of the total market demand for products, the number of used products recycled and the recycle rate of used products can be obtained under four different scenarios. In addition to the business as usual (BAU) scenario, any kind of scenarios represent the corresponding regulatory policy. The results show that, with respect to the BAU scenario, the penalty scenario and the reward-penalty scenario have a positive correlation with the recycling rate of used products, while the reward scenario has a negative correlation with the recycling rate. The impact of the reward-penalty scenario on the total market demand for products, cooperative social reputation and the number of used products recycled is related to the specified recycling rate, set by the government. In the end, the validity of the model is verified through numerical simulation and the sensitivity of the relevant parameters under the reward-penalty scenario are analysed. The conclusion of this paper is of great significance for designing precise policies to promote recycling of used products. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:二手产品回收是一种清洁和更环保的生产方式。回收和复制过程中的多重不确定性需要适当的政府监管。在古典博弈论的基础上,还考虑了合作社社会声誉的积极影响,构建了由制造商主导的动态Stackelberg游戏模型。对产品的总需求的比较,再循环的使用产品数量和使用的产品的再循环率可以在四种不同的场景中获得。除了常用(BAU)情景外,任何类型的情景都代表了相应的监管政策。结果表明,关于BAU情景,惩罚场景和奖励罚款情景与使用产品的回收率具有正相关性,而奖励情景与回收率具有负相关性。奖励罚款方案对产品总市场需求,合作社社会声誉和再生产品数量的影响与政府设定的指定回收率有关。最后,通过数值模拟验证了模型的有效性,并分析了奖励惩罚场景下的相关参数的灵敏度。本文的结论对于设计精确的政策具有重要意义,以促进二手产品的回收。 (c)2019 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Journal of Cleaner Production》 |2019年第20期|1153-1169|共17页
  • 作者单位

    Univ Chinese Acad Sci Sch Publ Policy & Management 19 A Yuquan Rd Beijing 100049 Peoples R China;

    Univ Chinese Acad Sci Sch Publ Policy & Management 19 A Yuquan Rd Beijing 100049 Peoples R China|Chinese Acad Sci Inst Sci 15 Zhongguancun Beiyitiao Beijing 100190 Peoples R China|Chinese Acad Sci Inst Dev 15 Zhongguancun Beiyitiao Beijing 100190 Peoples R China;

    Univ Florida Food & Resource Econ Dept Gainesville FL 32611 USA;

    Jiangxi Univ Tradit Chinese Med 818 Xingwan Ave Nanchang 330004 Jiangxi Peoples R China;

    Shenzhen Univ China Ctr Special Econ Zone Res Nanhai Ave 3688 Shenzhen 518060 Guangdong Peoples R China;

    Chinese Acad Sci Inst Sci 15 Zhongguancun Beiyitiao Beijing 100190 Peoples R China|Chinese Acad Sci Inst Dev 15 Zhongguancun Beiyitiao Beijing 100190 Peoples R China;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Government regulation; Used products recycling; Dynamic stackelberg model; Management performance;

    机译:政府监管;使用产品回收;动态Stackelberg模型;管理表现;

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号