Ethics, Markets, and the Legalization of Insider Trading

摘要

In light of recent doctrinal changes, we examine the confused state of U.S. insider trading law, identifying gaps that permit certain market participants to trade on the basis of material nonpublic information, and contrast U.S. insider trading doctrine with the European approach. We then explore the ethical implications of the status quo in the U.S., explaining why the dominant legal justifications for prohibiting classical insider trading and misappropriation-the fiduciary duty and property rights theories-fail to account for the wrongfulness of insider trading by eavesdroppers and certain tippees. We refute common arguments for legalizing insider trading, including arguments that insider trading is a victimless crime and that the practice promotes efficiency. We explain why insider trading constitutes the moral wrong of cheating, grounding our theory in the legitimate expectations of market participants. Having considered Kantian deontology in other work, we find that virtue ethics theory offers a helpful albeit rough framework for assessing the morality of insider trading independent of its legality. We also find that social contract theories, with norms of equality of opportunity and moral desert, provide a compelling ethical basis for retaining, clarifying and broadening current legal prohibitions against insider trading.