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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of applied econometrics >QUANTIFYING THE SUPPLY-SIDE BENEFITS FROM FORWARD CONTRACTING IN WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS
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QUANTIFYING THE SUPPLY-SIDE BENEFITS FROM FORWARD CONTRACTING IN WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS

机译:量化批发电力市场中向前合同的供应方利益

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摘要

The assumption of expected profit-maximizing bidding behavior in a multi-unit, multi-period auction with step-function supply curves is used to estimate cost functions for electricity generation units and derive tests of expected profit-maximizing behavior. Applying these techniques to data from the National Electricity Market in Australia reveals statistically significant evidence of output-dependent marginal costs within and across half-hours of the day, but no evidence against the hypothesis of expected profit-maximizing behavior. These cost function estimates quantify the economic significance of output-varying costs and how forward financial contract obligations impact the amount of these costs the generation unit owner incurs. This supplier's existing obligations imply average daily production costs that are 8% lower than the profit-maximizing pattern of output with no forward contract obligations.
机译:在具有阶跃函数供给曲线的多单元,多周期拍卖中,期望获利最大化投标行为的假设用于估算发电单位的成本函数,并推导预期获利最大化行为的测试。将这些技术应用于来自澳大利亚国家电力市场的数据,可以发现具有统计意义的证据,证明一天中半小时内以及整个半小时内依赖于输出的边际成本都存在,但没有证据支持预期的利润最大化行为这一假说。这些成本函数估算值量化了可变产出成本的经济意义,以及远期金融合同义务如何影响发电单位所有者承担的这些成本。该供应商的现有义务意味着平均每日生产成本比没有远期合同义务的产出利润最大化模式低8%。

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