The View From the Top of Arnstein's Ladder

摘要

Problem, research strategy, and findings: Participatory budgeting (PB) dedicates a portion of a public budget to the binding control of residents, who vote to determine its allocation. By conceding real decision-making power, PB holds out the promise of achieving the topmost rungs of Arnstein's ladder and the redistribution of political power in relatively short order. In this study, we use mixed methods to evaluate an attempted PB effort in Fresno (CA). A substantial budget and binding final vote strengthened the process. However, an initial failure to delegate decision-making power, a compressed timeline, and complex project eligibility restrictions limited its potential. Above all, limited participation from those not previously involved in municipal politics reflected both inadequate outreach and a broader dearth of member-led organizations. We conclude that implementing PB is only one step toward achieving the more transformational and radical vision of community control that Arnstein imagined. Ultimately, PB's long-term redistributive potential in any locale depends critically upon the broader political context in which it is undertaken. This research is limited by the use of a single, exceptional case study, but the mixed-methods approaches we use here draw on additional scholarship and data to outline a strategy to extend Arnstein's vision. Takeaway for practice: Attempts to implement PB may fail as a result of not incorporating a set of key design principles. Even where PB is properly implemented, community control of resources cannot be viewed as an end state. The potential for PB to realize transformational outcomes depends as much on broad-based community organizations as on the strength of the PB process itself. Planners should work closely with local groups to aid and encourage their development of community leaders by providing resources for outreach as well as powerful roles during process design.