Greening game analysis in supply chains under three decision-making structures

摘要

This paper examines a supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the two members put in efforts for 'greening' their operations. We consider three different decision-making structures and discuss the optimal decision model from each player's perspective. In model 1, the manufacturer invests in greening and sets the price for the product then the retailer invests in greening and sets the retail price. In model 2, manufacturer-Stackelberg games of greening and pricing are played in sequence. Model 3 outlines the Nash games of greening and pricing, in which the greening Nash game firstly played. Our analysis shows that the manufacturer's profit is the highest in model 1 where the manufacturer has the first mover advantage. However, the retailer's expected profit is the highest in model 3 where the retailer has a good share in the channel leadership. In all models, integrated channel profits are the highest under model 1.