A right to religious and moral freedom? A reply to Rafael Domingo

摘要

Let me conclude with a suggestion. I argue in support of protecting, as a single human right, religious and moral freedom. Professor Domingo, by contrast, argues in support of protecting two rights, between which, in his "Response," he distinguishes sharply: the right to religious freedom and the right to "freedom of conscience." The latter right, Professor Domingo explains, protects "moral autonomy" but not "moral independence." It seems clear that Professor Domingo believes that there is a practical difference between his position and mine. It is not clear to me, however, that there is a practical difference, much less what it is. It would be helpful if eventually Professor Domingo would clarify what he believes to be the practical difference between our respective positions by illustrating his position with concrete examples of conduct-of moral choices-that fit this profile: moral choices that are (conditionally) protected by the right to religious and moral freedom but not by the different right that Professor Domingo articulates and defends, the right that protects "moral autonomy" but not "moral independence." Does a women's choice to use contraceptives, for example, fit that profile?