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Real earnings manipulation surrounding mergers and acquisitions: the targets' perspective

机译:真正的盈利操纵周围的合并和收购:目标的观点

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摘要

Purpose - This paper aims to investigate whether UK public targets manage their earnings using real activities manipulation in the period prior to the announcement of a mergers and acquisition (M&A). It also examines whether the payment method in M&As affects the degree to which takeover targets manipulate earnings. Design/methodology/approach - Using a sample of 131 UK listed targets acquired over the period 1995-2013, this paper examines real earnings management (REM) by employing OLS regression models. The data related to deals have been mainly collected from Thomson One Banker and Thomson Reuters Eikon databases. REM is examined by investigating abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs. This analysis was supplemented by conducting additional robustness checks. Findings - The results show that UK takeover targets manage earnings upwards through cutting discretionary expenses in the year prior to the acquisition, while they do not do so by manipulating sales or production costs. Moreover, targets of cash-only or mixed-payment deals do not have the same strong motivation to manage their earnings as stock-financed deal target counterparts do. Our results continue to hold after using alternative accrual earnings management (EM) measures, controlling for unobservable firm heterogeneity using the fixed-effect model and controlling for endogeneity using the two-stage Heckman (1979) model. Practical implications - The main findings of this study could be beneficial for various parties involved M&As, such as standard setters and regulators. A need arises to improve disclosure rules and enhance overall financial reporting quality in the capital markets with the aim of reducing information asymmetry and agency conflicts. Originality/value - As far as the literature on EM around M&As is concerned, only EM by acquirers has been examined, and not much attention has been paid to targets' EM.
机译:目的 - 本文旨在调查英国公共目标是否在宣布合并和收购事项(并购)之前使用实际活动操纵来管理其收益。它还介绍了M&Ship的付款方式是否会影响收购目标操纵收益的程度。设计/方法/方法 - 使用1995 - 2013年期间收购的131英国上市目标的样本,本文通过雇用OLS回归模型来检查真正的盈利管理(REM)。与交易有关的数据主要来自汤姆森一家银行家和汤姆森路透eikon数据库。通过调查从运营,异常自由裁量费用和异常生产成本的异常现金流程来检查REM。通过进行额外的稳健性检查来补充该分析。结果表明,英国收购目标通过在收购事假前的一年中的酌情开支来管理盈利,而且通过操纵销售或生产成本,他们不这样做。此外,仅限现金或混合支付交易的目标与股票资助交易目标同行确实存在相同的强劲动力。我们的成果在使用替代权衡收益管理(EM)措施后继续持有,使用固定效果模型控制不可观察的坚定的异质性,并使用两级Heckman(1979)模型控制内部性能。实际意义 - 这项研究的主要结果可能对各方有益于M&AS,例如标准设定者和监管机构。有必要改善披露规则,并提高资本市场的整体财务报告质量,目的是减少信息不对称和机构冲突。原创/价值 - 就M&AS周围的文献而言,只有收购者才会审查了EM,并没有考虑到EM的关注。

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