Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond

摘要

In Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond, Eric J. Dahl discusses what remains one of the most important and pressing US domestic and international security threats: the prevention of surprise attacks. His discussion of surprise attacks and their origins extend beyond conventional definitions to include surprises from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. In this densely written book, a product of his doctoral dissertation Preventing Terrorist Attacks: Intelligence Warning and Policy Response at the Fletcher School (Tufts University), Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom on why intelligence fails and provides an alternative explanation of several momentous intelligence failures in US history based on his theory of preventive action (pp.23-4). Dahl, formerly a naval intelligence officer in the United States Navy, powerfully asserts that surprise attacks partially succeed because intelligence analysts sometimes have little information to work from, and are thus incapable of producing precise and specific intelligence products. Though he briefly mentions that his role as an intelligence officer in the United States Navy led him to ask why the American intelligence community often fails to prevent surprise attacks, the book is primarily about the importance of tactical intelligence and precise warnings, and the degree to which policymakers are receptive to finished intelligence products.