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An Annotated Explanation of Articles 1 and 2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

机译:世贸组织关于补贴和反补贴措施协定第1条和第2条的注释解释

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摘要

By chance, I served as head of Import Administration at the US Department of Commerce from 1981 to 1983. Until 1980, the Treasury Department was responsible for administration of US countervailing duty cases, and after World War Ⅱ Treasury decided it would not countervail any subsidies except for export subsidies. Most export subsidies that Treasury countervailed did not present difficult methodological issues: If Mexico, for example, gave a 10% bonus on the value of exports (the so-called CEDI), then it was quite simple to determine that there was a subsidy and that the value was 10%. No other country in the world used countervailing duties at that point, so as a result there had been very little thinking or work on the valuation of subsidies.
机译:一次偶然的机会,我在1981年至1983年期间担任美国商务部的进口管理负责人。直到1980年,财政部负责管理美国的反补贴案,第二次世界大战后,财政部决定不取消任何补贴。除了出口补贴。财政部反补贴的大多数出口补贴都没有提出困难的方法论问题:例如,如果墨西哥为出口价值提供10%的奖金(所谓的CEDI),那么很容易确定是否存在补贴和该值为10%。当时,世界上没有其他国家使用反补贴税,因此,对补贴的估价几乎没有思考或工作。

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