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Decision Making and Ability: An Explanation of Elitism in China's Government

机译:决策与能力:对中国政府精英主义的一种解释

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This article tries to explain elitism in China's governmental decision making. Our model shows that the governments' expected utility increases with a bureaucrat's ability to make decisions under the flexible framework of delegation and communication (with separated reporting strategy). In the early of 1950s, China's government choose a flexible decision making framework in order to efficiently manage many affairs in a complex environment. This initial choice started the process of a self-reinforcing demand for ability inside of the flexible decision making framework. With the current reforms of streamlining administrations and retreating from the market, the elitism of China's government might reverse.
机译:本文试图解释中国政府决策中的精英主义。我们的模型表明,政府的预期效用随着官僚在授权和沟通的灵活框架(具有独立的报告策略)下做出决策的能力而增加。 1950年代初,中国政府选择了一个灵活的决策框架,以便在复杂的环境中有效地管理许多事务。最初的选择开始了在灵活的决策框架内部自我增强对能力的需求的过程。随着当前简化政府机构和退出市场的改革,中国政府的精英主义可能会逆转。

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