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The successor's dilemma in China's single party political system

机译:中国一党政治体制中的继任者困境

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An autocratic ruler seeking a successor who will recognize and maintain his legacy faces a dilemma. The designated successor may become too successful politically and threaten the autocrat's rule, or if not successful in achieving recognition, the designated successor may fail to remain in office after the ruler dies, and the ruler's legacy will not be sustained. The dilemma is also that of the successor in choosing self-promotion that threatens the still-living ruler. I examine the solution to the successor's dilemma in the single-party system China. Uniquely for an autocracy, China has term limits and also age limits on political office. I describe how term limits and dual-generation designation of successors on the basis of "checks-and-balances" were the consequence of a rational choice of Deng Xiaoping, as a paramount leader, to resolve the successor's dilemma so as to extend his own power to sustain his legacies.
机译:寻求继承者的专制统治者会承认并维护自己的遗产会面临两难境地。指定的继任者可能在政治上变得过于成功,并威胁到独裁者的统治,或者如果未能成功获得承认,则指定的继任者可能在统治者去世后无法继续任职,并且统治者的遗产将无法维持。继任者在选择自我晋升方面也面临着两难选择,这威胁了仍然活着的统治者。我研究了单党制中国解决继任者困境的方法。中国是专制独裁国家,对政治职位有任期限制和年龄限制。我描述了邓小平作为最高领导人合理地选择解决继任者的困境以扩展他自己的困境时,其任期限制和在“制衡”基础上进行两代代指的结果。维持他的遗产的力量。

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