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首页> 外文期刊>European journal of political economy >Term limit extension and electoral participation. Evidence from a diff-in-discontinuities design at the local level in Italy
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Term limit extension and electoral participation. Evidence from a diff-in-discontinuities design at the local level in Italy

机译:任期延长和选举参与。来自意大利本地级别的不连续差异设计的证据

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We study the effect of term limits on voter turnout in Italian local elections. Since 2014 the Italian law allows mayors in municipalities with a population size lower than 3,000 inhabitants to re-run for a third term, whereas mayors in cities with a number of residents above the cut-off still face a two-term limit. The introduction of the reform permits us to implement a difference-in discontinuities design exploiting the before/after with the discontinuous policy change. We find that voters negatively react to the introduction of the reform: electoral participation decreases by about 5 percentage points in municipalities eligible to the treatment compared to municipalities in the control group. This negative effect is essentially driven by a decrease in the political competition. We also find that relaxing term limits does not improve the quality of politicians running for election.
机译:我们研究了期限限制对意大利当地选举中选民投票率的影响。自2014年以来,意大利法律允许人口不足3,000的直辖市的市长连任第三届,而居民人数超过临界值的城市的市长仍面临两个任期的限制。改革的引入使我们能够利用不连续政策变更前后的差异实施不连续性设计。我们发现,选民对改革的实施产生了消极反应:与对照组相比,有资格获得这种待遇的城市的选民参与减少了约5个百分点。这种消极影响主要是由于政治竞争的减少所致。我们还发现,放宽任期限制并不能提高竞选政客的素质。

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