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Bid Design Effects in Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice Contingent Valuation

机译:多重有界离散选择或有评估中的投标设计效果

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摘要

A potential concern in "multiple bounded discrete choice" contingent valuation surveys - where the respondent is asked to express voting certainty, rather than a simple yes or no, on a large number of payment amounts (bids) - is whether responses are influenced by the particular position of bids in the bid-voting panel rather than solely on the respondent's willingness to pay (WTP). For instance, respondents may systematically state they would pay the first few bid amounts and not pay all subsequent bids --regardless of the actual dollar values. Such systematic bid design effects would suggest that this method does not provide a valid measure of WTP. Using a split-sample survey, we compare responses to three different bid arrays that have an identical minimum bid, maximum bid, and number of bids. Using nonparametric estimation techniques, we find that estimated WTP distributions and corresponding welfare measures are not statistically different across survey samples.
机译:在“多重有界离散选择”或有价值评估调查中,潜在的关注点是:是否要求受访者对大量付款金额(出价)表达投票确定性,而不是简单地是或否。投标在投标面板中的特定位置,而不是仅仅取决于受访者的付款意愿(WTP)。例如,受访者可能会系统地声明,他们将支付前几个出价,而不支付所有后续出价-不管实际的美元价值是多少。这种系统的出价设计效果可能表明该方法无法提供有效的WTP指标。使用拆分抽样调查,我们比较了三个具有相同的最低出价,最高出价和出价数量的出价阵列的响应。使用非参数估计技术,我们发现估计的WTP分布和相应的福利措施在调查样本之间没有统计学差异。

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