Russian Oil and Gas: A Realistic Assessment

摘要

An open evaluation of Russian Oil and Gas reserves has not been possible until recently for several reasons. In the Soviet Union, hydrocarbon resources were a strategic asset and as such, a state secret that could only be guessed at from the outside. Other organizations, such as the CIA and International Energy Association made educated guesses but from an ideological point of view; Soviet reserves were a threat from a security and market supply standpoint and were perhaps minimized. The only firm evidence came from Soviet production of oil, reaching 12 MMBO/D in the late 1980's or about 20% of the world production. Either the reserve numbers were wrong or the Soviet Union was depleting its reserve base at an accelerated rate of about 8% per year. The accelerated rate was the view of the CIA and seemed to be supported by the collapse in production from 1990-1995 to 6 MMBO/D. However, in the late 1990's production began to rise again, reaching 8 MMBO/D in 2001. YUKOS predicts that production will continue to rise to 14 MMBO/D by 2010, 75% in Russia and the rest in the Caspian region. This presentation will focus on Russia, as the projected rise in Caspian production is well documented (largely based on four projects; Tenghiz, Karachaganak, Kashagan and Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli) and will happen without the necessity of any new developments. The Russian evaluation is based on four factors; the current booked reserves, the production level of the reserves, oil and gas remaining to be found and export capacity.