首页> 外文期刊>The economist >Free exchange | String-pushers
【24h】

Free exchange | String-pushers

机译:免费交流|推弦器

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

Incumbent politicians know that if the economy is doing well, they are much more likely to be re-elected. When wages are rising and jobs are plentiful, workers feel happy. Small wonder, then, that many governments attempt to manipulate the economy to boost their political fortunes. New research, though, shows that however hard politicians try, shaping the economy to suit their electoral needs is a tall order. In a paper published in 1975 William Nordhaus of Yale University posited the existence of a "political business cycle" (pbc). He suggested that in the run-up to an election, politicians go on a spending binge. They may increase the generosity of unemployment benefits, for instance, or cut taxes. This, they hope, will give the economy a short-term boost, maximising their chance of reelection. After the election, though, they often have to cut back to stop the economy overheating and debt piling up.
机译:现任政治家知道,如果经济状况良好,他们更有可能连任。当工资上涨且工作机会充裕时,工人会感到高兴。因此,难怪许多政府试图操纵经济以增加其政治财富。不过,新的研究表明,无论政客们多么努力地努力,使经济适应他们的选举需求都是一项艰巨的任务。耶鲁大学的威廉·诺德豪斯(William Nordhaus)在1975年发表的一篇论文中提出了“政治经济周期”(pbc)的存在。他建议在选举前夕,政客们要大肆消费。例如,它们可能会增加失业救济金的慷慨性,或削减税收。他们希望,这将给经济带来短期推动,从而最大程度地提高其连任的机会。但是,在大选之后,他们常常不得不削减开支以阻止经济过热和债务堆积。

著录项

  • 来源
    《The economist》 |2015年第8934期|70-70|共1页
  • 作者

  • 作者单位
  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 23:28:23

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号