Power Allocation and Investment Efficiency of Parent-Subsidiary Company&br/&—Empirical Analysis Based on the Perspective of Subdivision of Power

摘要

Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies in 2009 and 2019 as samples, from the perspective of financial rights and personnel rights, this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between their allocation between parent and subsidiary and the overall investment efficiency of listed companies and their subsidiaries, and further analyzes the moderating effect of the two on the above two relationships. The research shows that: 1) in the current stage, the concentration of financial rights improves the investment efficiency of the parent-subsidiary company; 2) the concentration of the power over personnel has an inverted U-shaped relationship with investment efficiency; 3) from the moderating effect of the two, the concentration of financial power flattens the inverted U-shaped relationship between the concentration of personnel power and investment efficiency; 4) the concentration of personnel power amplifies the promoting effect of financial power concentration on investment efficiency, but this effect is not clear at the low level of personnel power concentration. The research of this paper is helpful to provide more concrete and operational reference and suggestions for the management and control of enterprise groups.