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首页> 外文期刊>JMLR: Workshop and Conference Proceedings >Kidney Exchange with Inhomogeneous Edge Existence Uncertainty
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Kidney Exchange with Inhomogeneous Edge Existence Uncertainty

机译:肾交换与不均匀的边缘存在不确定性

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Patients with end-stage renal failure often find kidney donors who are willing to donate a life-saving kidney, but who are medically incompatible with the patients. Kidney exchanges are organized barter markets that allow such incompatible patient-donor pairs to enter as a single agent—where the patient is endowed with a donor “item”—and engage in trade with other similar agents, such that all agents “give” a donor organ if and only if they receive an organ in return. In practice, organized trades occur in large cyclic or chain-like structures, with multiple agents participating in the exchange event. Planned trades can fail for a variety of reasons, such as unforeseen logistical challenges, or changes in patient or donor health. These failures cause major inefficiency in fielded exchanges, as if even one individual trade fails in a planned cycle or chain, emph{all or most of the resulting cycle or chain fails}. Ad-hoc, as well as optimization-based methods, have been developed to handle failure uncertainty; nevertheless, the majority of the existing methods use very simplified assumptions about failure uncertainty and/or are not scalable for real-world kidney exchanges.Motivated by kidney exchange, we study a stochastic cycle and chain packing problem, where we aim to identify structures in a directed graph to maximize the expectation of matched edge weights. All edges are subject to failure, and the failures can have nonidentical probabilities. To the best of our knowledge, the state-of-the-art approaches are only tractable when failure probabilities are identical. We formulate a relevant non-convex optimization problem and propose a tractable mixed-integer linear programming reformulation to solve it. In addition, we propose a model that integrates both risks and the expected utilities of the matching by incorporating conditional value at risk (CVaR) into the objective function, providing a robust formulation for this problem. Subsequently, we propose a sample-average-approximation (SAA) based approach to solve this problem. We test our approaches on data from the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) and compare against state-of-the-art approaches. Our model provides better performance with the same running time as a leading deterministic approach (PICEF). Our CVaR extensions with an SAA-based method improves the $lpha imes 100%$ ($0
机译:患有终末期肾功能衰竭的患者经常发现曾经愿意捐赠救生肾脏的肾脏捐赠者,但谁与患者医学不相容。肾脏交换是有组织的易货市场,允许这种不相容的患者供体对作为单一的药剂进入 - 患者赋予捐赠者“物品” - 与其他类似药剂进行贸易,使得所有代理商“给予”捐赠器官如果且只有当他们收到一个机关作为回报。在实践中,有组织的交易发生在大型循环或链状结构中,具有参与交换事件的多个代理商。计划交易可能因各种原因而失败,例如不可预见的后勤挑战或患者或捐助者健康的变化。这些失败导致有关交易所的主要效率,好像一个单独的交易在计划的周期或链条中失败, EMPH {所有或大多数生成的周期或链条失败}。已经开发了Ad-hoc,以及基于优化的方法,以处理失败的不确定性;尽管如此,大多数现有方法都使用对失败的不确定性和/或不可扩展的现有方法,以便通过肾交换来扩展,我们研究了随机循环和连锁包装问题,我们的目标是识别结构一个有向图,最大化匹配边缘权重的期望。所有边缘都受到故障,故障可能具有非识别概率。据我们所知,当失效概率相同时,最先进的方法只是易行的。我们制定了相关的非凸优化问题,并提出了一种易于混合整数的线性规划重构来解决它。此外,我们提出了一种模型,该模型通过将风险(CVAR)的条件值(CVAR)纳入目标函数来提供匹配的所有风险和预期的实用程序,为此问题提供鲁棒制定。随后,我们提出了一种基于样的样本近似(SAA)方法来解决这个问题。我们测试我们的联合网络数据的方法,用于器官分享(UNOS),并与最先进的方法进行比较。我们的模型提供了具有与主要的确定性方法相同的运行时间的性能(PICEF)。我们的CVAR扩展具有基于SAA的方法,可提高$ alpha times 100%$($ 0 < alpha LEQ 1 $)与现有模型相比,最坏情况性能。

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