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Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

机译:煤矿运营安全生产系统三边演进的游戏建模与战略研究:一种模拟方法

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In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry.
机译:鉴于煤矿业的特殊性和高风险,煤矿企业内部多个代理的决策行为在确保煤矿业的安全和可持续发展方面发挥着非常重要的作用。现有的煤矿安全生产文献研究主要侧重于政府,企业本身等外部实体之间的统计分析,从宏观角度来看,企业内部的员工,是揭示动态相互作用的研究在直接参与煤矿事故的行动者中,也就有效互动的提案,这将导致安全结果改善。因此,本文探讨了进化博弈论描述了中国煤矿安全生产系统中利益攸关方之间的互动,其中包括组织,第一线矿工和一线经理。此外,本文还探讨了进化博弈模型的动态模拟,以分析利益相关者相互作用的稳定性和识别均衡解决方案。仿真结果表明,当满足某些条件时,组织,矿工和经理的决策行为可以进化为独特的理想稳定状态(1,1,1,1)。此外,具有相对较高的三种代理的初始比例的策略组合比相对低的策略组合更快地收敛到理想状态。此外,稳定状态和平衡值不受初始值变化的影响。最后,我们发现积极激励政策和严格的惩罚政策的结合可以使进化游戏系统更快地收敛到所需的稳定性。在模拟煤矿安全生产的多人游戏过程中的应用进化和数值模拟是一种有效的方法,这为煤矿业的安全和可持续发展提供了更有效的解决方案。

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