Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduced the extended mind hypothesis, according to which some mental states can be realized by non-biological external resources. A lively debate has flourished around this hypothesis, connected with the issues of embodiment, embeddedness, situatedness and enaction (cf. Clark, 2008; Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011). Two of the main criticisms addressed to the functionalist version of the extended mind thesis have been the so-called “coupling-constitution fallacy” and the alleged lack of a mark of the cognitive (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2010a,b). According to Adams and Aizawa, extended cognition is a logical possibility, but is not instantiated in our world. Following this view, they defend a “contingent intracranialism,” based on a specific mark of the cognitive that they propose. In this paper I intend to show that neither criticism is effective against the extended cognition thesis. In particular:.
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机译：克拉克和查默斯（Clark and Chalmers，1998）引入了扩展的心理假设，根据该假设，可以通过非生物外部资源实现某些心理状态。关于这一假说的热烈辩论已经展开，涉及到具体化，嵌入性，环境和行为等问题（参见Clark，2008; Menary，2010; Shapiro，2011）。功能主义版本的扩展思维论文的两个主要批评是所谓的“耦合宪法谬误”和所谓的缺乏认知的标记（Adams和Aizawa，2001、2005、2009、2010a， b）。根据亚当斯和相泽的说法，扩展认知是合乎逻辑的可能性，但在我们的世界中并未实例化。按照这种观点，他们根据他们提出的认知的特定标记来捍卫“偶然的颅内主义”。在本文中，我打算表明，两种批评都不能有效地对抗扩展认知论点。尤其是：。
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