We investigate experimentally the underlying motivations and individual dierences with regard to the participation in between-group conflict in nested social dilemmas. In our nested social dilemmas, the collective is divided into two groups, and individuals allocate tokens between a private, a group-specific, and a collective good. We vary the marginal per capita return of the group-specific and collective good in order to manipulate the motivational within- and between group conflicts. A first experiment shows that a between-group conflict leads to within-group cooperation and particularly individuals with positive other-regarding preferences (prosocials) react to a between-group conflict by contributing to the group-specific good. Hence, paradoxically, individuals with positive other-regarding preferences may foster between-group conflicts. A second experiment reveals that prosocials' contributions to the group-specific or collective good vary as a function of the personal costs of within-group versus collective cooperation, supporting the weighted average social preference theory by Charness and Rabin (2002).
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机译：我们通过实验研究了嵌套社会困境中参与群体间冲突的潜在动机和个体差异。在我们嵌套的社会困境中，集体分为两组，个人在私人，特定群体和集体物品之间分配代币。为了控制群体内部和群体之间的动机，我们改变了特定于群体的商品和集体商品的人均边际收益。第一个实验表明，群体之间的冲突会导致群体内部的合作，尤其是具有积极的其他方面偏好的人（亲社会主义者）会通过为群体特定的物品做出贡献来应对群体之间的冲突。因此，自相矛盾的是，具有其他积极偏好的个人可能助长群体间的冲突。第二个实验表明，亲社会对群体特定或集体利益的贡献随群体内部与集体合作的个人成本而变化，这支持了Charness and Rabin（2002）的加权平均社会偏好理论。
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