Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008) and in the comment by Brunner, Camerer and Goeree (2009). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different strategy against each of them. The games were played in two network structures: a attice and a circle. We compare our results with the predictions of different theories (Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action‐sampling equilibrium, payoff‐sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) and the experimental results of Selten and Chmura (2008). One result is that the majority of players choose the same strategy against each neighbor. As another result we observe an order of predictive success for the stationary concepts that is different from the order shown by Selten and Chmura. This result supports our view that learning in networks is different from learning in random matching.
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机译：我们的研究分析了网络中战略互动的学习理论。参与者玩了Selten和Chmura（2008）使用的2 x 2游戏中的两个，以及Brunner，Camerer和Goeree（2009）的评论。每个参与者都与四个邻居对抗，可以针对每个邻居选择不同的策略。游戏以两个网络结构进行游戏：一个阁楼和一个圆圈。我们将我们的结果与不同理论的预测（纳什均衡，量化响应均衡，行动采样均衡，回报采样均衡和冲动均衡）以及Selten和Chmura（2008）的实验结果进行比较。结果是大多数玩家对每个邻居都选择了相同的策略。作为另一个结果，我们观察到平稳概念的预测成功顺序与Selten和Chmura显示的顺序不同。这一结果支持了我们的观点，即网络学习不同于随机匹配学习。
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