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Game Playing Analysis of Planning and Supervision Collusion in RealEstate Land

机译:房地产土地计划监督合谋的博弈分析。

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The development of a dynamic game model for planning a double and duplication of supervision based on theindeterminate appointment probability and order of supervisors on the grounds of the current causes of planning and supervisioncollusion in real estate land is presented in this paper and the question how to separate the planning from supervisionavailably is analyzed. The dynamic game is employed for the study. Results are as follows: First, feasibility andavailability of planning a double (planning and supervision) are verified theoretically, which can reduce the monitoringcost. The higher the appointment probability of the second party of planning supervisors, the greater the risk pressure andmoral remorse of the earlier planning supervisors. Thus, milder punishment is required to separate planning from supervision.Secondly, under planning and supervision, the earlier planning supervisors always dread supervision from the secondparty and the collusion probability with real estate developers is reduced. Therefore, the policy of planning and supervisionshould be vigorously marketed.
机译:本文提出了一种基于不确定的监事任命概率和次序的动态博弈模型,以规划监管的双重性和重复性,并基于当前房地产土地规划与监管共谋的原因,提出了如何分离的问题。分析了监督制定的计划。动态游戏用于研究。研究结果如下:首先,从理论上验证了双重计划(计划和监督)的可行性和可用性,可以降低监测成本。规划主管第二方的任命可能性越高,早期规划主管的风险压力和道德and悔就越大。第二,在计划和监督下,较早的计划监督者总是不愿与第二方进行监督,从而降低了与房地产开发商勾结的可能性。因此,应该大力推销规划和监督政策。

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