In ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’, Kripke articulates his project in the discourse of “possible worlds”. There has been much philosophical discussion of whether endorsement of the Kripke semantics brings ontological commitment to possible worlds. However, that discussion is less than satisfactory because it has been conducted without the necessary investigation of the surrounding philosophical issues that are raised by the Kripke semantics. My aim in this paper is to map out the surrounding territory and to commence that investigation. Among the surrounding issues, and my attitudes to them, are these: (1) the potential of the standard distinction between pure and impure versions of the semantic theory has been under-exploited; (2) there has been under-estimation of what is achieved by the pure semantic theory alone; (3) there is a methodological imperative to co-ordinate a clear conception of the purposes of the impure theory with an equally clear conception of the content the theory; (4) there is a need to support by argument claims about how such a semantic theory, even in an impure state, can fund explanations in the theory of meaning and metaphysics; (5) greater attention needs to be paid to the crucial advance that Kripke makes on the precursors of possible-worlds semantics proper (e.g. Carnap 1947) in clearly distinguishing variation across the worlds within a model of modal space from variation across such models and, finally, (6) the normative nature of the concept of applicability, of the pure semantic theory, is both of crucial importance and largely ignored.
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