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An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Enterprise Risk Management and Corporate Value—From the Perspective of Top Executives Incentives

机译:企业风险管理与企业价值关系的实证研究-基于高管人员激励的视角

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摘要

Top executives incentives and risk management are important contents of corporate governance research. However, few empirical data studies of risk management take top level manager incentives economic benefit into account, and the executive incentives effectiveness is unclear in most studies, the paper collected empirical data of listed companies in financial industry in 2008-2013, and we found a inverted “U” shaped non-linear curve exists from the relationship between ERM and corporate value, when it exceeds a certain level, ERM will come into being an significantly diminishing marginal effect. Secondly, when the degree of top executives incentives become weak, on the contrary, the risk management behaviors will happen with increasing frequency and improve reflected coefficients between enterprise value and ERM, and it’s contributive to raise enterprise value. However, this influence is weak and not significant for executive equity incentive. The empirical results provide some references for the financial enterprise risk management application and the practice of executive incentive.
机译:高管人员的激励措施和风险管理是公司治理研究的重要内容。然而,很少有关于风险管理的经验数据研究将高层管理者激励的经济利益考虑在内,并且在大多数研究中高管激励的有效性尚不清楚,该论文收集了2008-2013年金融业上市公司的经验数据,我们发现从企业风险管理与企业价值的关系来看,存在“ U”字形的非线性曲线,当超过一定水平时,企业风险管理的边际效应就会大大降低。其次,相反,当高层管理人员的激励程度变弱时,风险管理行为就会越来越频繁地发生,并且会改善企业价值与企业风险管理之间的反映系数,从而有助于提高企业价值。但是,这种影响是微弱的,对于高管股权激励而言并不重要。实证结果为金融企业风险管理应用和高管激励实践提供了参考。

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