首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Business and Management >Directors’ Political Connections and Compliance with Board of Directors Regulations: The Case of S&P/Tsx 300 Companies
【24h】

Directors’ Political Connections and Compliance with Board of Directors Regulations: The Case of S&P/Tsx 300 Companies

机译:董事的政治关系和对董事会法规的遵守:以S&P / Tsx 300公司为例

获取原文
       

摘要

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Further to the various scandals that shook North-American markets in the early 2000s, Canada reacted in 2004 and 2005 by changing its regulations on the governance practices of listed companies. Faccio (2006) and otherauthors have argued that politically connected companies can have less regulatory oversight than unconnected firms. This affirmation raises an issue that this article attempts to solve, i.e., whether politically connected Canadian companies are less compliant with regulatory requirements on governance than unconnected firms, and with board of directors requirements in particular. Although politically connected and unconnected firmsdiffer significantly in their compliance with regulation, the analyses show that the state of being politically connected tends to have little bearing on regulatory compliance.
机译:正常0 21否否否MicrosoftInternetExplorer4继2000年代初震惊北美市场的各种丑闻之后,加拿大在2004年和2005年做出了反应,改变了其对上市公司治理行为的法规。 Faccio(2006)和其他作者认为,具有政治联系的公司比没有联系的公司具有更少的监管监督。这种肯定提出了一个本文试图解决的问题,即与具有关联关系的加拿大公司相比,与没有关联关系的公司相比,其在治理方面的监管要求是否较不遵从,尤其是在董事会要求方面。尽管具有政治联系和不联系的公司在遵守法规方面有很大差异,但分析表明,具有政治联系的状态对法规遵从性的影响很小。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号