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Status analysis and control measures of the debt risk in Chinese local government: based on the study of the relationship between “power, responsibility, and interests”

机译:中国地方政府债务风险现状分析与控制措施-基于“权力,责任与利益”关系的研究

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Abstract From the view of current conditions and developing trends of the debt scale in Chinese local government, the debt crisis will explode in the near future if it cannot be controlled in an effective way. According to the regional distribution in China, except for Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Hainan, the debt risk is mainly concentrated in the western region. In a further step, it can be seen that this risk of debt is resulted by the imbalanced relationship between “power, responsibility, and interests” which contains non-accordance of debt power (such as debt-financing power), confusion of debt responsibility (such as debt-management responsibility), and distortion of debt interests (such as private benefit and public interests). For this problem to be corrected, using the local government’s debt for private interests should be prevented, realizing the local debt behavior takes to the "faithful" service for the public interests. To realize this purpose, it is important to monitor the relationship between “power, responsibility, and interests,” which is the most important factor for setting up the debt risk control system of Chinese local governments. In particular, the control system should include the following aspects. First, it should find the right time to empower local government with debt power. Second, on the basis of both positive and negative sides, it should design a system to restrict the debt responsibility in local government, which is necessary to solve problems such as new debt, invalid debt, and overdue debt expansion. Third, it should propose the guidance mechanism to realize the convergence from the private benefit to the social interests on the local debt.
机译:摘要从中国地方政府债务规模的现状和发展趋势来看,如果不采取有效的控制措施,债务危机将在不久的将来爆发。根据中国的区域分布,除北京,上海,天津和海南外,债务风险主要集中在西部地区。在更进一步的步骤中,可以看出这种债务风险是由“权力,责任和利益”之间的不平衡关系造成的,其中包括债务权力(例如债务融资能力)的不一致性,债务责任的混淆(例如债务管理责任),以及债务利益(例如私人利益和公共利益)扭曲。为了纠正此问题,应避免将地方政府的债务用于私人利益,而将地方债务行为视为对公共利益的“忠实”服务。要实现这一目标,重要的是要监测“权力,责任和利益”之间的关系,这是建立中国地方政府债务风险控制体系的最重要因素。特别地,控制系统应包括以下方面。首先,它应该找到合适的时间赋予地方政府以债务权。其次,要在正反两面的基础上,设计一种限制地方政府债务责任的制度,这对于解决新债,无效债,逾期债务扩大等问题是必要的。第三,应提出一种指导机制,以实现地方债务从私人利益向社会利益的融合。

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