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Coercive redistribution and public agreement: re‐evaluating the libertarian challenge of charity

机译:强制性再分配和公共协议:重新评估慈善机构的自由主义挑战

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In this article, we evaluate the capacity of liberal egalitarianism to rebut what we call the libertarian challenge of charity. This challenge states that coercive redistributive taxation is neither needed nor justified, since those who endorse redistribution can give charitably, and those who do not endorse redistribution cannot justifiably be coerced. We argue that contemporary developments in liberal political thought render liberalism more vulnerable to this libertarian challenge. Many liberals have, in recent years, sought to recast liberalism such that it is more hospitable to cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity. This move has resulted in increased support for the claim that liberalism should be understood as a political rather than comprehensive doctrine, and that liberal institutions should draw their legitimacy from agreements made among members of an appropriately conceived deliberative community, rather than from controversial liberal principles like individual autonomy. We argue that, while this move may indeed make liberalism more compatible with cultural diversity, it also makes it more vulnerable to the libertarian challenge of charity. Not all versions of liberalism are troubled by the challenge, but those that are troubled by it are increasingly dominant. We also discuss G.A. Cohen's claim that liberal equality requires an ‘egalitarian ethos’ and argue that, if Cohen is right, it is difficult to see how there can be an adequate response to the libertarian challenge of charity. In general, our argument can be summarised as follows: the more that liberalism is concerned accurately to model the actual democratic wishes and motivations of the people it governs, the less it is able to justify coercively imposing redistributive principles of justice. View full textDownload full textKeywordstaxation, coercion, liberalism, deliberative democracy, incentives, G.A. CohenRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230903326281
机译:在本文中,我们评估了自由主义平均主义反驳我们所谓的慈善自由主义者挑战的能力。这项挑战指出,既不需要强制性征税又没有正当理由,因为支持重新分配的人可以慈善捐助,而不支持重新分配的人则不能被合理地强制。我们认为,自由主义政治思想的当代发展使自由主义更容易受到这种自由主义者的挑战。近年来,许多自由主义者试图重塑自由主义,以使其对文化,宗教和种族多样性更加热情。这一举动导致人们更加支持以下主张:自由主义应被理解为一种政治而不是全面的学说,而自由主义机构应从一个经过适当构想的协商团体成员之间达成的协议中获取其合法性,而不是从有争议的自由主义原则中汲取合法性。个人自治。我们认为,尽管这一举动确实可能使自由主义与文化多样性更加兼容,但也使它更容易受到自由主义者对慈善机构的挑战。并非所有版本的自由主义都受到挑战的困扰,但那些受到挑战困扰的自由主义者却越来越占主导地位。我们还将讨论G.A.科恩声称自由主义平等需要一种“平等主义精神”,并认为,如果科恩是对的,很难看到如何对自由主义的慈善挑战做出适当的回应。总的来说,我们的论点可以概括如下:自由主义越关注精确地为它所统治的人民的实际民主愿望和动机建模,就越不能证明强制实施正义的再分配原则。查看全文下载全文关键词税收,强制,自由主义,协商民主,激励措施CohenRelated var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand:“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”,servicescompact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,发布号:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230903326281

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