This article contributes to the critical engagement with luck egalitarianism by advancing two arguments. Firstly, it questions the cogency of the dichotomies - e.g., luck/choice, person/circumstance, agency/structure - and the accompanying moral ideal of pure voluntarism. This makes it difficult for luck egalitarianism to dissect appropriately the inequalities embedded in social relations, such as social networks and involuntary associations, in which voluntariness and contingency as well as agency and structure are intertwined. Secondly, it suggests that the relational approach, which has been developed, inter alia, in the empirical study of inequality, provides a morally and practically adequate perspective on egalitarian justice. The relational approach achieves this by converging upon those inâbetween social relations that are irreducible to the macroâlevel structure and to microâlevel agency. Moreover, a relationally sensitive perspective on inequality can adeptly respond to the difficulties that luckâegalitarian theories encounter.View full textDownload full textKeywordsluck egalitarianism, egalitarian justice, relational approach, social networks, involuntary associationsRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2010.517984
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