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Fight or flee: Outside director departures prior to contested management buyout offers

机译:战斗或逃离:在有争议的管理买断提供之前,董事外部偏离

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Research Question/Issue: We investigate outside director departures prior to management buyout offers (MBOs). In these transactions, managers have both an information advantage and incentives to make a lowball offer to shareholders. Outside directors can safeguard against managerial self-dealing by negotiating for the best terms for public shareholders from either management or another bidder. Research Findings/Insights: It is typical that outside directors stay on the board through an MBO offer as MBOs are less likely to have changes in directors-either joining or leaving-relative to a control sample. After controlling for endogeneity as well as firm and director characteristics, we find that outside directors are more likely to leave when the offer is later contested. We do not find any evidence that departing directors are replaced by new outside directors who ensure shareholders get a higher premium nor do we find any evidence that the board acts as a public auctioneer. We also find that outside directors are more likely to depart when the buyout contest is longer. Our findings show that outside directors provide a weak internal monitoring mechanism as they leave precisely when shareholders need their expertise the most. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results contribute to research that supports the notion that outside director departures are symptomatic of board weakness. The results of our study support the contention of other researchers that outside directors often fail to monitor managers. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our study offers useful information to M&A investment banking advisors and leverage buyout analysts by showing the mechanisms under which director turnover can affect the value and the outcome of MBOs.
机译:研究问题/问题:我们在管理买断提供(MBO)之前调查外部董事。在这些交易中,管理人员拥有信息优势和激励措施,为股东制作一个低位优惠。境外董事可以通过谈判来自管理人员或其他投标人的公共股东的最佳条款来维护管理自我处理。研究发现/见解:典型的是,由于MBO优惠,董事通过MBO优惠留在董事会上,因为MBO不太可能导致董事会发生变化 - 无论是加入还是离开 - 相对于对照样本。在控制内核性以及公司和导演特征后,我们发现在提议后期有争议的情况下,境外董事更有可能离开。我们没有找到任何证据,即离开董事被新的外部董事所取代,他们确保股东获得更高溢价,也没有找到董事会作为公共拍卖师的任何证据。我们还发现,在收购比赛更长的时候,境外董事更有可能离开。我们的研究结果表明,外部董事提供了薄弱的内部监测机制,因为当股东最需要其专业知识时,它们就会如此恰当地留下。理论/学术意义:我们的结果有助于研究支持外部董事偏离的概念是底板缺陷的症状。我们研究的结果支持其他研究人员的争论,外面董事往往无法监督经理。从业者/政策影响:我们的研究提供了对并购投资银行顾问的有用信息,并通过展示导演成交量可能影响价值和MBO的结果的机制来利用收购分析师。

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