The self-help deployed in the Achille-Lauro and Yunis cases as well as in the Israeli interceptions demonstrates that the efficient breach theory has operated effectively in practice. In those cases, all the elements of the efficient breach theory were met: (1) the abducting country had a legitimate jurisdictional claim; (2) other states had failed to act; (3) the threat was imminent; (4) the actions did not result in harm to bystanders or the accused; (5) the actions were minimally intrusive; (6) a dangerous figure was neutralized yet still enjoyed a fair trial; and (7) when there was protest, international order was restored through official warning. The limits of the theory are discernible, as evidenced by Alvarez-Machain—a case that arguably tests those limits—but do not defeat its persuasiveness. The efficiency justification obviates the need for formalistic interpretations or creative extensions of state or international law as seen in Alvarez-Machain. Instead, the practice is effectively regulated by existing instruments and, as a result, has generally been used in a careful, targeted manner. Under this theory, the United States could interrupt bin Laden's travel without any legal discomfort and could help protect international interests, all without damaging international relations. Reliance on reprisal would be justified because here, self-help would ensure the neutralization of an international threat to peace and security, and existing international bodies could respond effectively to any protest. Thus, forcible abduction has a proper role within both the Bush Doctrine and international law.
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