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ON THE BUDDHIST TRUTHS AND THE PARADOXES IN POPULATION ETHICS

机译:佛教伦理与人口伦理中的悖论

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Starting point The starting point of this paper is the following citation concerning the state of contemporary population ethics:Most discussion in population ethics has concentrated on how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations ‘is better than’ and ‘is as good as’. This field has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. (Arrhenius 2004, 201) Type of problem The best known and most discussed example shattering our intuitions is Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. This paper explores the potential of the Buddhist Truths to answer the following questions: What is at the source of the Mere Addition Paradox? and Why are paradoxes unavoidable in population ethics? Results The comparison of classical utilitarian and Buddhist intuitions demonstrates the close tie between intuitions and interests. The perplexing Buddhist intuition about non-existence can be explained (except for metaphysical reasons) by a radically different priority given to survival. The method of measuring the quality of life is not decisive for the existence of paradoxes; the Buddhist axiology changes but does not remove counter-intuitive combinations. If the conflict of interest (quantity versus quality) is described within a two-parameter model, it causes conflicting intuitions; in axiologies that favour quantity (utilitarianism) or quality (perfectionism), the conflicting intuitions inevitably lead to paradoxes. In order to find a compromise, one would have to find a universal interest and a corresponding universal intuition; the obvious candidate to meet this request is sympathy but, since there is no universal consensus on the desirable degree of sympathy, the normative force of such an approach is limited. Breaking out of the two-parameter model and accepting the incommensurability of certain qualities threatens the normative claim of population ethics.View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639940903239819
机译:起点本文的起点是以下有关当代人口伦理现状的引文:人口伦理中的大多数讨论都集中在如何评估人口的善意,即如何通过关系对人口进行排序– “好于”,“好”。这个领域充满了悖论,似乎表明在人数和他们的福利变化的情况下,我们认为的信念是不一致的。 (Arrhenius 2004,201)问题类型打破直觉的最著名和讨论最多的例子是Parfit的Mere Addition悖论。本文探讨了佛教真理的潜力,可以回答以下问题:单纯的加法悖论的根源是什么?为什么人口伦理学中不可避免地存在悖论?结果古典功利主义与佛教直觉的比较表明直觉与利益之间有着紧密的联系。佛教关于不存在的困惑直觉可以通过生存的根本不同来解释(除了形而上学的原因)。衡量生活质量的方法对于存在悖论不是决定性的;佛教的价值观念发生了变化,但并没有消除反直觉的组合。如果在两个参数的模型中描述了利益冲突(数量与质量),则会导致直觉冲突。在偏爱数量论(功利主义)或品质(完美主义)的价值论中,直觉上的矛盾不可避免地导致悖论。为了找到一种折衷办法,必须找到一种普遍利益和相应的普遍直觉。满足此要求的显而易见的候选人是同情,但由于在理想的同情程度上尚未达成共识,因此这种方法的规范作用受到了限制。突破两参数模型并接受某些质量的不可通约性威胁了人口伦理的规范主张。查看全文下载全文相关的var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand:“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”,service_compact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter, technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more“,发布:” ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b“};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639940903239819

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