Hardware Trojan Detection by Multiple-Parameter Side-Channel Analysis

摘要

Hardware Trojan attack in the form of malicious modification of a design has emerged as a major security threat. Side-channel analysis has been investigated as an alternative to conventional logic testing to detect the presence of hardware Trojans. However, these techniques suffer from decreased sensitivity toward small Trojans, especially because of the large process variations present in modern nanometer technologies. In this paper, we propose a novel noninvasive, multiple-parameter side-channel analysis-based Trojan detection approach. We use the intrinsic relationship between dynamic current and maximum operating frequency of a circuit to isolate the effect of a Trojan circuit from process noise. We propose a vector generation approach and several design/test techniques to improve the detection sensitivity. Simulation results with two large circuits, a 32-bit integer execution unit (IEU) and a 128-bit advanced encryption standard (AES) cipher, show a detection resolution of 1.12 percent amidst $(pm 20)$ percent parameter variations. The approach is also validated with experimental results. Finally, the use of a combined side-channel analysis and logic testing approach is shown to provide high overall detection coverage for hardware Trojan circuits of varying types and sizes.