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Intention without action? Differences between whistleblowing intention and behavior on corruption and fraud

机译:没有行动的意图? 炫耀意图与腐败和欺诈行为的差异

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摘要

Whistleblowing is an effective tool against fraud and corruption in organizations. However, as researchers have struggled to acquire data on actual whistleblowers, research relies on hypothetical intention data and student samples, which is seen as a major limitation. Using a field study of 1,416 employees from China, Germany, and Russia, the purpose of this article is to identify differences and similarities between intention and actual whistleblowing decisions, thus aiding research and interpretation of prior and future studies. I also contribute by analyzing whether findings can be generalized across different cultures and whether status and power influence the whistleblowing process. My results reveal that the key difference between hypothetical and real decisions is not in variables that affect the process, but in effect sizes: Employees underestimate the effect of situational (retaliation) and organizational (compliance measures) variables in hypothetical compared to actual whistleblowing. Thus, reliance on intention research is not inherently problematic, when effect sizes are interpreted with caution. I also find that results are similar across countries and that status and power may not be decisive factors in whistleblowing. My findings should also be of interest to practitioners and policymakers, as they assist in designing effective whistleblowing systems and environments in organizations.
机译:Whistleblow是针对组织欺诈和腐败的有效工具。然而,随着研究人员努力获得关于实际举报人的数据,研究依赖于假设的意图数据和学生样本,这被视为一个主要限制。利用来自中国,德国和俄罗斯1,416名员工的实地研究,本文的目的是识别意图与实际举报决策之间的差异和相似之处,从而助攻对先前和未来研究的研究和解释。我还通过分析在不同文化中概括的结果以及是否会影响举报过程。我的结果表明假设和实际决策之间的关键差异不是影响过程的变量,但实际上大小:员工低估了情况(报复)和组织(合规措施)变量与实际举报相比的假设中的变量。因此,依赖于意图研究并不是有问题的,当致法谨慎时,当效果大小被解释时。我还发现,在各国中,结果是相似的,而且举报的地位和权力可能不是令人讨厌的因素。我的调查结果也应该感兴趣的是从业者和政策制定者,因为他们有助于在组织中设计有效的举报系统和环境。

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  • 来源
    《Business Ethics》 |2021年第3期|447-463|共17页
  • 作者

    Oelrich Sebastian;

  • 作者单位

    Otto von Guericke Univ Fac Econ & Management Magdeburg Germany;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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