How Not To Do Things With Words: J. L. Austin on Poetry

摘要

If philosophy and poetry are to illuminate each other, we should frst understand their tendencies to nmutual antipathy. Examining (and, where possible, correcting) mutual misapprehension is part of this ntask. J. L. Austin’s remarks on poetry offer one such point of entry: they are often cited by poets and ncritics as an example of philosophy’s blindness to poetry (I). These remarks are complex and their pur-npose obscure—more so than those who take exception to them usually allow or admit (II). But it is nreasonable to think that, for all his levity at their expense, what Austin offers poets is exemption from nforms of commitment. Since such exemption is precisely what poets and critics have sought, this diag-nnosis is eirenic (III). This exemption has a price, but it may be affordable (IV).